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NOTES AND COMMENTS
court, not only to appoint an attorney for a person unable to employ
counsel but to appoint adequate counsel.'
If the court intended to say that the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution applied to this Indiana case, as it might
be inferred that it did, this would be an erroneous statement, since
the Sixth Amendment, as well as other provisions in th- original fed-
eral bill of rights, applies only to the federal government and not to
the state government.2
However, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does apply to the states and the United States Supreme Court has
extended the due process clause so as to include most of the provisions
of the original federal bill of rights3 and it has extended it to include
the right to counsel,4 but in so doing it has taken the position that
the due process clause does not compel a state to furnish counsel.5
For this reason the court was wrong in saying that thu action of the
trial judge in appointing counsel violated the due prccess clause of
the United States Constitution.
But the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees an impartial tribunal 6 and it might be that in this case,
as the court said, the judge acted so that his tribunal was not im-
partial, even though due process does not guarantee a jury trial (or
at least that he did not give appellant an orderly course of procedure);
and to this extent the court might correctly say that the trial was in
violation of the Constitution of the United States.
LEGISLATION
THE PERRY-DECATUR BOUNDARY DISPUTE
In 1933 the Board of Commissioners of Marion County entered
an order changing the boundary between Perry and Decatur Town-
ships. The effect of this action was to locate valuable property
of the Indianapolis Power & Light Co. within the ]anits of Perry
Township which had formerly been in Decatur Township. In 1943 an
1. State ex rel. White v. Hilgemann, Sudge, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E. (2d)
129 (1941); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217
Ind. 493, 29 N.E.(2d) 405 (1940); Sanchez v. State, 199 Ind. 235,
247, 157 N.E. 1, 5 (1927). In a federal case the United States
Supreme Court has held that the guaranty of counsel in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution has the same mean-
ing. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1.42). See also
People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
2. Betts v. Brady, Warden, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Barren v. Mayer,
etc. of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833); Willis, "Constitutional Law"
(1935) 502, 562.
3. Near v. Minnesota etc., 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Willis, "Constitu-
tional Law" (1935) 655.
4. Powell et al. v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. Betts v. Brady, Warden, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
6. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
7. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
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emergency bill became law' which provided for a uniform method of
altering township boundaries. The act concluded with a proviso
which restored boundaries previously changed by a different pro-
cedure where such townships included within their limits a part of
a city having a population of 300,000 or more. The proviso ob-
viously affected the Perry-Decatur boundary and none other, and
the effect was to restore the line existing prior to 1933. Perry
Township and others brought suit for a declaratory judgment in
which the constitutionality of the act was attacked, and from a
decision upholding it, they appealed to the Supreme Court. Held,
reversed. The proviso is inherently local and special in nature
and is, therefore, void. Perry Civil Township of Marion County
et al. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. et al., -- d-, 51
N.E. (2d) 371 (1943).
The reasoning by which the court invalidated this enactment
may be summarized thusly: (1) Historically, legislation affecting
counties has usually been special; 2 (2) Similarly, legislation affecting
townships has usually been general, though " . . . the general as-
sembly might, in the first instance, have directly defined the boun-
daries of every township in the state . . . 3; (3) Townships and
'counties may be treated alike from the standpoint of legislation affect-
ing them; 4 (4) The matter of changing township boundaries may prop-
erly be the subject of general laws; 5 (5) As a general law the proviso
is void because, though general in form, it is special in fact since the
classification rests on no rational basis and is an arbitrary limitation
on the operation of the act.6
It is elementary that a statute even under a constitutional pro-
hibition is not a priori invalid because it is local or special, and here
the appellees vigorously contended that even though special the act
was constitutional. The court seems not to have adequately answered
that contention.
Assuming the proviso is not general, it is not necessarily void.7
The Indiana Constitution expressly forbids special legislation on sev-
enteen enumerated subjects, the tenth of which relates to "county and
township business."8  However, the term "business," as here employed,
" . . . when applied to a public corporation, signifies the conduct
of the usual affairs of the corporation, and the conduct of such affairs
1. Acts 1943, c. 23, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933 Supp.) § 65-
130. Approved by the Governor February 13, 1943.
2. See instant case at 373.
3. See instant case at 373.
4. See instant case at 373.
5. See instant case at 374. Note that the Court did not assert
that special laws on the subject would be improper.
6. See instant case at 374.
7. Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 23.
8. Ind.' Const. Art. IV, §22. "The General Assembly shall not
pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated
cases, that is to say: . . . [10.] Regulating county and town-
ship business .... 
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as commonly engage the attention of township and county officers. '9
This definition of subsection 10, which has remained unchanged since
1883,' o appears not to include the matter of altering township boun-
daries, and while the court stated that such might properly be the
subject of general laws, they carefully avoided any assertion that the
proviso violated the express prohibition of the subsection.
The framers of the constitution, in an abundarice of caution,
followed the seventeen prohibitions with a section forbidding special
legislation " . . . in all other cases where a general law can be
made applicable . . . . "I" If the statute here in jeopardy is special
but does not do violence to Section 22 (10), the inquiry then is: Would
a general law be applicable? 12 A review of the case& indicates that
it is exceedingly doubtful whether this question is a judicial one.13
Two years after the adoption of our present constitution, it was
decided in the case of Thomas et al. v. Clay County14 that the courts
are competent to inquire whether or not a general law could be made
applicable. There was little, if any, discussion of this problem until
1868 when the much cited case of Gentile v. Stater, inaugurated the
doctrine that the question rests exclusively in the legislative judgment
and discretion, and that its determination is not open to judicial
review. 6 This doctrine was consistently followed with hardly a dissent
9. Mount, Trustee v. The State, ex rel. Richey, 90 Ind. 29, 31 (1883).
This definition was approved in Mode et al. v. Beasley et al.,
143 Ind. 306, 316, 42 N. E. 727, 730 (1895) and again in Bolivar
Township, Bd. of Fin. of Benton County v. Hawkdns et al., 207
Ind. 171, 196, 191 N. E. 158, 168 (1934).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 23. "In all cases enumerated in the pre-
ceding Section, and in all other cases where a general law can
be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform
operation throughout the State."
12. "The next question is, this not being 'county business', Does
§23 of Art. 4 apply. . .?" Crist et al. v. Molony et al., 187 Ind.
614, 616, 119 N.E. 1001, 1003 (1918). See .also Horack, "Special
Legislation: Another Twilight Zone" (1936) 12 Ind. L. J. 109
where it is said at 124: "The form of enactmimt is not con-
clusive; thus an act general in form but special in fact will
be treated, judicially, as a special act. Agair, it should be
warned that this does not mean that the act is unconstitutional.
If not relating to one of the seventeen prohibited subjects, its
validity cannot be questioned unless a general law would have
been inapplicable."
13. See notes 14, 15, and 16 infra; cf. Note (1942) 1 Ind. L.J. 140.
14. 5 Ind. 4 (1854).
15. 29 Ind. 409 (1868).
16. " . . . the question whether a general law . . . can be made ap-
plicable and of uniform operation throughout the State, rests
exclusively in the legislative judgment and discretion, which
cannot be reviewed by the courts; and ...when the Legislature
has determined the question by enacting such a law, that is final
and conclusive on that subject." Mode et al. v. Beasley et al., 143
Ind. 306, 315, 42 N.E. 727, 729 (1895) citing with approval
Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868).
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for sixty-six years17 and was cited with approval by a federal court
as late as 1931.18 In 1934 the case of Heckler v. Conter et al.19
boldly purported to overthrow the long-standing rule of the Gentile
case and to re-establish the position taken in Thomas et al. v. Clay
County. So far as discovered, however, the Heckler case has not
been followed "on this point,20 and furthermore has since been re-
jected in Groves v. Lake County.21 The Groves opinion failed even
to mention the Heckler case and apparently went directly back to
the Gentile case doctrine, thus leaving the question in a state of
uncertainty. Whatever may be said of the decision in the Groves
case, it undoubtedly modifies and weakens the bold assertions of the
Heckler opinion, m2 yet the court in the instant case by-passed and
entirely avoided discussion of this issue.
It should be further noted that "The problem in last analysis
is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion con-
ceded to the lawmakers. Only in cases of plain abuse will there be
revision by the courts." 23 It would thus appear that the courts should
tread lightly with respect to the policy underlying legislative action
for this is the legislature's domain, and the courts are usually not
17. Jennings County et al. v. Fetter, 193 Ind. 288, 139 N.E. 451(1923) ; Crist et al. v. Molony et al., 187 Ind. 614, 119 N.E.
1001 (1918); Mode et al. v. Beasley et al., 143 Ind. 306, 42
N.E. 727 (1895);Young v. Tipton County et al., 137 Ind. 323,
36 N.E. 1118 (1894); Bell et al. v. Maish et al., 137 Ind. 226,
36 N.E. 358 (1894); State ex rel. City of Terre Haute v. Kolsem
et al., 130 Ind. 434, 29 N.E. 595 (1891); Hovey, Governor, et al.
v. Foster, 118 Ind. 502, 21 N.E. 39 (1889); City of Evansville
v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1889); Wiley v. Bluffton,
111 Ind. 152, 12 N.E. 165 (1887); Johnson v. Wells County
et al., 107 Ind. 15, 8 N.E. 1 (1886); Warren v. City of Evans-
ville, 106 Ind. 104, 5 N.E. 876 (1886); Kelly, Treasurer, v.
The State, 92 Ind. 236 (1883); Mount, Trustee, v. State ex rel.
Richey, 90 Ind. 29 (1883). See also Crawford, "Statutory Con-
struction" (1940) § 83; Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (1st
ed. 1891) § 116.
18. See Handy v. Johnson et al., 51 F. (2d) 809, 811 (E.D.Tex. 1931).
19. 206 Ind. 376, 187 N.E. 878 (1933).
20. Cf. Crowe v. St. Joseph County et al., 210 Ind. 404, 3 N.E. (2d)
76 (1936).
21. 209 Ind. 371, 199 N.E. 137 (1936); accord, State v. Clements, 215
Ind. 666, 22 N.E. (2d) 819 (1939).
22. Horack, "Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone" (1936)
12 Ind. L. J. 109, 120.
23. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Williams v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 46 (1933). See Sutherland, "Statutory
Construction" "(Horack's ed. 1943) § 2106. See also Horack,
"Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone" (1936) 12 Ind.
L. J. 109 where it is said at 119: "The question - whether
a particular community . . . needs special legislative attention
- requires only a policy judgment; and when a court en-
deavors to review such a judgment they enter into the field of
legislation. This, of course, is not necessarily bad, although it
may lead to 'mistaken judgment and conscientious weakness'."
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so well informed as to the reasons which impelled the enactment.24
A statute otherwise valid should not be stricken down though the
policy upon which it rests in a vicious one.25 Even though it be
doubtfully assumed that a desirable result was obtained in the instant
case, it is submitted that the short-cut by which the court reached
its objective affords little satisfaction to the proponents of the act
and those injuriously affected by its fall.
PROCEDURE
CONCLUSIVENESS OF SHERIFF'S RETURN
In a recent case the Indiana Appellate Court held:
(1) that an alleged non-resident defendant in an action m personam (to
recover an unpaid loan) properly raised the question of jurisdiction
over his person, where the sheriff had returned that the defendant
had been served by leaving a copy at his last and usual place of
residence, by an answer in abatement rather than by a motion to
quash;
(2) that the taking of a deposition to be used on the trial of the
issues raised by the answer in abatement did not constitute a general
appearance in the action; and
(3) that because the fact as to the residence of the defandant was
not presumptively within the knowledge of the sheriff, the defendant
was not bound by the usual conclusive presumption as to the correct-
ness of a sheriff's return. Donnelley v. Thorne, - Ind. App. -,
51 N.E. (2d) 873 (1943).
The first two propositions decided are unquestionably correct and
find uniform support in the previous Indiana cases. The motion to
quash is properly used only where the issue sought to be raised is
one which can be decided on the record itself and which, therefore,
does not require the proof of extrinsic facts for it3 decision. The
issue raised was as to the residence of the defendant in the state
and clearly the proper procedure for raising the question is by
answer in abatement and not by a motion to quash. Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Black, 80 Ind. 513 (1881). In view of that fact that the taking of a
desposition on the merits of a case is not a general appearance,
Coplinger v. The David Gibson, 14 Ind. 480 (1860), it follows that
the taking of a deposition on an answer in abat ment is not a
general appearance. The fact that the evidence adduced on the
taking of the deposition may be related in part to the merits of
the case would not alter the result.
The third point decided goes beyond any previcus Indiana case
on this subject so far as the language of the opinion is concerned
although obviously the result reached is quite proper, and indeed
necessary.
The Supreme Court cases on this subject have held that in the
24. Vandali. R.R. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N.E. 289 (1914);
Pittsbui h, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. State, 180 Ind. 245, 102 N.E.
25 i.±91j); State v. Barrett, 172 Ind. 169, 87 N.E. 7 (1909).
25. Mount, frus ee, v. State ex rel. Richey, 90 Ind. 29 (1883).
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